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NOTES
Cancellation of Certificates of Citizenship for Fraud or Illegality in the
Procurement Under Section 15 of the Naturalization Act of 1906

"To provide for a uniform rule for the naturalization of aliens throughout the United States," Congress passed, in 19o6, the Naturalization Act,1
which is the present organic law. Prior to its enactment, competition between the federal and state courts had led to a great deal of irregularity and
inconsistencies in the administration of the naturalization law. 2

Further,

political leaders, motivated by a desire to swell the ranks of favorable voters,
1. 34 STAT. 596 (1907), 8 U. S. C. A. §§ 351-415 (1927).
2. 40 CONG. REC. 7036 (io6).
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used the courts and their agents to foster a great deal of illegality and fraud
3
in the procurement of the coveted citizenship certificates. The Act, after
establishing rigid requisites for citizenship and prescribing the proper procedure, granted the government two weapons to combat possible irregularities. Under Section ii of the Act,4 the United States government was
given the right to appear at the naturalization hearings, examine witnesses,
produce evidence, and object to the issuance of the certificate. The other
weapon, Section 15,5 permitted the government to institute proceedings in
the appropriate court, to set aside a certificate already granted "on the
ground of fraud or on the ground that such certificate of citizenship was
illegally procured." An attack under Section 15 has been ruled an independent and direct one and therefore not subject to criticism on the theory
that it constitutes a collateral attack upon the judgment of the naturalizing
court.6 Having interpreted Section 15 as permitting a direct attack, the
courts were then called upon to answer the question raised in Johannessen
v. United States.7 : is the naturalization judgment res judicata as to matters
actually litigated therein, where the government has availed itself of the
rights created by Section i i ? United States v. Ness," and United States v.
Maney,9 which followed it, answered the question negatively, by ruling that
the two sections were intended to afford cumulative and not alternative
remedies.' 0 These cases, although questioned on a few occasions, have been
accepted as conclusive on the proposition." Having determined that the
3. Id. at 7o36-7037. See also H. R. Doc. No. 46, 59th Cong., Ist Sess. (1!o6) 79.
The irregularities are referred to in United States v. Ness, 245 U. S. 319, at 324
(1917); United States v. Lenore, 2o7 Fed. 865, at 867 (E. D. N. D. 1913). Beitz,

Naturalization (193o)

3 LINCOLI L. REv. I1, 13.

4. "The United States shall have the right to appear before any court or courts

exercising jurisdiction in naturalization proceedings for the purpose of cross-examining
the petitioner and the witnesses produced in support of his petition concerning any
matter touching or in any way affecting his right to admission to citizenship, and shall
have the right to call witnesses, produce evidence, and be heard in opposition to the
granting of any petition in naturalization proceedings."
S. "It shall be the duty of the United States District Attorneys for the respective
districts, or the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner of Naturalization, upon affidavit showing good cause therefor, to institute proceedings in any court having jurisdiction to naturalize aliens in the judicial district in which the naturalized citizen may
reside at the time of bringing the suit, for the purpose of setting aside and cancelling
the certificate of citizenship on the ground of fraud or on the ground that such certificate of citizenship was illegally procured."
6. United States v. Ness, 245 U. S. 319 (1917); United States v. Spohrer, 175
Fed. 440 (C.C. N. J. x9io).
7. Johannessen v. United States, 225 U. S. 227 (1912). "What may be the effect
of a judgment allowing naturalization in a case where the government has appeared
and litigated the matter does not concern us." Id. at 237.
8. United States v. Ness, 245 U. S. 319 (917). The court also discussed the scope
of the two sections. They felt that, although cumulative, Section ii was broader for
"opposition to the granting of a petition for naturalization may prevail because of
objections to the competency or weight of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses,
or mere irregularities in procedure. A decision on such minor questions, at least of a
state court of naturalization, is, though clearly erroneous, conclusive even as against
the United States if it entered an appearance under Section ii." Id. at 325.
9. United States v. Maney, 278 U. S. I7 (1928). See also Hazard, The Doctrine
of Res J.tdicata in Naturalization Cases i; the United States (1929) 23 Am. J. INT.
L. 5o.
1o. It is important to remember that the government can appeal from an order
granting citizenship. Estrin v. United States, So F. (2d) 105 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
ii. In United States v. Villaneuva, 17 F. Supp. 485 (D. Nev. 1937), the doctrine
was held inapplicable even though the government commenced an appeal, prosecuted
to the filing of its bill of complaint and then abandoned it. Cf. United States v. Srednik, i9 F. (2d) 71 (C. C. A. 3d, 1927). An interesting problem arose after the decision of United States v. Thind, 261 U. S. 204 (1923), which held that a "high-caste
Hindu of pure blood" was not a "white person" within the meaning of the Act. Sev-
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government can cancel the certificates "illegally or fraudulently procured",
our next problem is a consideration of the circumstances under which a
court will find that a certificate has been illegally or fraudulently procured.
I. "ILLEGALLY PROCURI"

Defining the rather vague term "illegally procured" as used in Section
15 has led to a clear split of authority. The majority view, of which United
States v. Ginsberg 12 is the leading case, defines the term as signifying a
failure to adhere completely to the requirements of the Act.'" Thus it is
defined as being contrary to law. Mr. Justice McReynolds, in the Ginsberg
case, held that a certificate was illegally procured where the appellant took
his oath in the judge's chambers rather than in open court. The test
adopted in this case was:
"If procured when prescribed qualifications have no existence in fact
it is illegally procured; a manifest error by the judge can not supply
nor render their existence non-essential." 34
The rationale of this majority view is that citizenship is a grant of a privilege
and not a matter of right, and, being a privilege, can only be acquired after
meticulous adherence to the requirements of the Act.' 5 This demand on the
part of the majority view finds support in the language of the Act, where it
is stated:
"That an alien may be admitted to become a citizen of the United States
in the following manner and not otherwise." "I
The majority view seems to carry out one of the principal purposes of the
Act: the desire to promote greater uniformity of procedure in naturalization
cases.' 7 In opposition to this line of authority, Judge Learned Hand '8
argued that "'illegally procured' means procured by subornation or some
other means used to impose upon the court, it does not mean that the certificate was issued through error of law." 19 United States v. Lenore,20 citing
this rule with approval, contained language to the effect that only when "false
and spurious certificates were obtained without any judicial proceeding whateral proceedings were instituted to cancel certificates granted to such persons prior to
1923. Two of them, Mozumder v. United States, 299 Fed. 24o (C. C. A. 9th, 1924),
and United States v. Ali, 2o F. (2d) 998 (E. D. Mich. 1927) allowed cancellation.
United States v. Pandit, 15 F. (2d) 285 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926), cert. denied, 273 U. S.
759 (1927) ruled that the question was res judicata. See United States v. Gokhale, 26
F. (2d) 36o (C. C. A. 2d, 1928), 278 U. S. 612 (1928). On these latter cases, see
Note (1927) 21 Am. J. IiT. L. io6.
12. 243 U. S. 472 (1917).

13. Ibid. See also United States v. Maney, 278 U. S. 17 (1928) ; United States

v. Plaistow, 189 Fed. ioo6 (W. D. N. Y. 191o).
14. 243 U. S. 472, 475 (1917).

15. United States v. Maney, 278 U. S.17 (1928) ; United States v. Ginsberg, 243
U. S. 472 (1917) ; Johannessen v. United States, 225 U. S. 227 (1912) ; United States
v. Plaistow, 189 Fed. ioo6 (W. D. N. Y. 191o) ; Beitz, supra note 3, at 15.

16. See note 4 sipra.
17. H. R. Doc., op. cit. supra note 3.

18. Luria v. United States, 184 Fed. 643 (S. D. N. Y. 1911), aff'd, 231 U. S. 9
(1913).
i. 184 Fed. 643, 646 (S.D. N. Y. 1911).

2o. United States v. Lenore, 207 Fed. 865 (D. N. D. 1913). To the same effect,
see United States v. Richmond, 17 F. (2d) 28 (C. C. A. 3d, 1927) ; United States v.
Salomon, 231 Fed. 928 (C. C. A. 5th, 1916) ; United States v. Ellis, 185 Fed. 546 (C.
C. E. D. La. 1911) ; United States v. Bialoglowski, 21 F. Supp. 613 (S.D. Cal. 1938) ;
United States v. Butikofer, 228 Fed. 918 (E. D. Idaho 1916) ; United States v. Erickson, 188 Fed. 747 (W. D. Mich. igio).
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ever, or by a proceeding in court which was itself sham and spurious" 21 will
the certificate be set aside as illegally procured. These cases rely heavily
and sham naturalization cases
upon the attempt to eliminate the spurious
22
which led to the adoption of the Act.
With this difference of the definition of the term "illegally procured"
in mind, it will be well to examine the cases to determine the application of
these theories to the factual situations which have been brought up under
Section 15.
a. Five Years Residence Priorto Naturalization
Under the statutory requirement that, at the time of his petition, the
alien shall have "continuously resided" within the United States for a period
of five years next preceding his petition,23 we find some rather interesting
problems. The courts were unanimous in holding that the act did not
require actual, uninterrupted, physical residence, for to hold so would mean
that every time an alien left the country for a visit or a short business trip,
he would have to commence his five-year period anew. 24 Through judicial
construction the term became synonymous with bona fide residence and a
temporary absence coupled with the requisite intent to return did not disrupt
the running of the period.2 5 However, there still remained the problem of
whether a certificate of citizenship issued by a court apprised of all the facts
was subject to cancellation even though the naturalizing court felt that the
facts warranted a finding of five years bona fide residence. United States v.
Mulvey 26 involved a certificate granted to an applicant who had left the
country to visit his sick mother and had been delayed abroad for a period of
two years. The court allowed cancellation, their rationale being that the fiveyear clause was inserted to enable the applicant to learn our institutions and
government and an absence of two years was inconsistent with this purpose.2 7 United States v. Shanahan,2 decided in the same year as the
Mulvey case, refused the government's petition in a case involving similar
facts. The theory employed by this court was that the finding of bona fide
residence by the naturalization court was a finding of fact and such finding
could not be disturbed in an attack under Section 15. Later cases are in
accord with this line of reasoning and refuse cancellation if the court, with
all the facts before it, found the requir-ment satisfied9
An amendment to the Act removed another conflict in these residence
cases.2 0 Many of our aliens had left this country as employees of the government or of private corporations to perform services in foreign countries;
United States v. Lenore, 207 Fed. 865, 868 (D. N. D. 1913).
op. cit. supra note 2.
23. Sec. 4 (4).
24. United States v. Mulvey, 232 Fed. 513 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916); United States v.
Shanahan, 232 Fed. 169 (E. D. Pa. 1916) ; United States v. Cantini, 199 Fed. 859 (W.
D. Pa. 1912), rev'd, 212 Fed. 925 (C. C. A. 3d, 1914).
25. United States v. Yatsevitch, 33 F. (2d) 342 (D. Mass. 1929) ; United States
v. Jorgenson, 241 Fed. 412 (W. D. Mich. 1916) ; United States v. Shanahan, 232 Fed.
169 (E. D. Pa. 1916).
26. United States v. Mulvey, 232 Fed. 513 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916).
27. Id. at 516. In United States v. Jorgenson, 241 Fed. 412 (W. D. Mich. 1916),
the court distinguishes this case from the Mulvey case on the ground that in the Jorgenson case the applicant was an employee of the United States Government and could
therefore learn the principles of our government. Id. at 416.
28. 232 Fed. 169 (E. D. Pa. 1916).
29. United States v. Yatsovitch, 33 F. (2d) 342 (D. Mass. 1929) ; United States
v. Srednik, ig F. (2d) 71 (C. C. A. 3d, 1927). In the Srednik case the court said it
was purely a question of fact and legal construction, and the United States, being duly
represented, should have appealed if aggrieved by the fact finding.
30. 49 STAT. 1925 (1936), 8 U. S. C. A. §382 (a) (Supp. 1939).
21.

22. CONG. REC.,
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as a result there had been a split on the question of whether absence due to
such employment should render the residence non-continuous. In Schradieck
v. United States " the certificate was cancelled where the applicant spent
four of the five-year period abroad as an employee of a private corporation.
In United States v. Jorgenson32 a different result was reached where the
employment was with the government. Under the amendment, the problem
will seldom arise for absence due to employment by the government or certain designated types of corporations may not be held to break the running
of the five-year period.
b. Five Years of Good Moral Behavior Prior to Naturalization
Section 4 of the Act provides that the applicant must make it appear
to the naturalizing court that for a period of five years next preceding his
petition he has behaved as a man of good moral character. Faced with a
problem similar to the one in the preceding section, it is not surprising to
find the same split of authority. 33 Thus, United States v. Wexler 8 permitted cancellation where the alleged adultery occurred more than four years
prior to the petition and all the facts of the alleged crime were presented to
the court by the government under Section ii. The naturalization court,
faced with evidence of the alleged adultery, found that the applicant had
shown himself a man of good moral conduct. The court, in the cancellation
suit, said the applicant was ineligible and that therefore the citizenship was
illegally procured. The dissenting judge in Turle] v. United States 35
argued that where the court granting the certificate is convinced that the
applicant is of good moral conduct, this finding of fact should not be disturbed. Faced with a stronger case for cancellation than the Wexler case,
the court in United States v. Bischof 36 adopted the argument of the dissent
in the Turlej case saying that a distinction must be drawn between cases
involving jurisdictional prerequisites to naturalization and mere fact finding.
Although there is a stronger argument for permitting cancellation in these
cases than in the residence cases, for here it is not as clear a case of fact
finding as it was in those cases, it seems that the government should avail
itself of its right to appeal where the alleged "illegality" is due to a factfinding adverse to the government's position. This solution was strongly
8
advocated by the court in the Bischof case. 7
c. Naturalizationof Persons Excluded From Citizenship by the Act
Since these cases present situations in which the alien is specifically
excluded from citizenship, it is not surprising that we find unanimity among
the courts in sustaining the petition by the government. The most common
type of case arising in this connection is that of illegal entry by the alien.
In such cases there is no question of fact to be determined by the naturaliza31. United States v. Schradieck, 29 F. (2d)

24 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928).
United States v. Jorgenson, 241 Fed. 412 (W. D. Mich. I916).
33. Cases allowing cancellation: Turlej v. United States, 31 F. (2d) 696 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1929) ; United States v. Milder, 284 Fed. 571 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922) ; United
States v. Unger, 26 F. (2d) I14 (S. D. N. Y. 1928) (adultery); United States v.
Mirsky, 17 F. (2d) 275 (S. D. N. Y. 1926) (liquor violation) ; United States v. Wexler, 8 F. (2d) 88o (E. D. N. Y. 1925) (adultery); United States v. Zaltsman, 19 F.
Supp. 305 (W. D. N. Y. 1937). Cases refusing cancellation: United States v. Bischof,
48 F. (2d) 538 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931); United States v. Dwyer, 17o Fed. 686 (C. C. D.
Mass. 19o9).
34. United States v. Wexler, 8 F. (2d) 88o (E. D. N. Y. 1925).
35. Turlej v. United States, 31 F. (2d) 696, 699 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
36. United States v. Bischof, 48 F. (2d) 538 (C. C. A. 2d, 193). Here the divorce court found, as a fact, that applicant had committed adultery.
37. Id. at 539.
32.
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tion court for the alien cannot possibly have established residence unless his
entry was legal and this is so regardless of his intent to remain here. Being
ineligible to citizenship, courts have found little trouble in cancelling the
certificates on the ground that they were illegally procured. 88 Similar
results have been obtained where, although the entry was legal, it was
merely for a temporary visit and therefore not permanent residence.39
Another group of cases presenting the same problem arose after United
States v. Thind 40 ruled that Hindus were not white persons within the terms
of the Act. Following the Thind case, several suits instituted under Section
15 met with complete success. 41 In United States v. Gokhale 42 the court
was of the opinion that the naturalization court had not decided a question
of fact; it was purely a question of a prerequisite to naturalization and, not
43
being satisfied, the certificate was subject to cancellation.
d. Failure of the Court to Adhere to Technical Requirements of the Act
One of the most interesting cases, although it is now merely historically
44
so, is that of United States v. Ginsburg.
After satisfying all other requirements of the Act, petitioner received his oath of allegiance in the judge's
chambers instead of in open court as required by the Act. The court, construing the Act literally, felt that an error by the judge in failing to adhere
to the technical requirements of the Act was fatal, and rendered the certificate illegally procured.45 In a somewhat similar situation, United States v.
Richmond 46 held that an act of the judge which did not adhere to the statutory requirements could not be the basis for a suit to set aside the certificate.
The court, however, attempted to reconcile the instant case with the Ginsburg case on the ground that in the latter case the court never convened
and that therefore it was a jurisdictional defect. In United States v. Leles 47
and United States.v. Nisbet -3 the courts permitted cancellation where the
defect complained of was the naturalization court's failure to examine petitioner's witnesses in open court. United States v. Olaechea 49 went further
than these two cases in permitting cancellation where the defect allegedly
rendering them illegally procured was in the failure of the court to submit
the petitioner to an examination by the Naturalization Bureau's representa38. United States v. Taub, E. D. Pa., March i4,194o; United States v. Beda, 30
F. Supp. 446 (E.D. N. Y. 194o); United States v. Marino, 27 F. Supp. 155 (S.D.
N. Y. 1939) ; United States v. Parisi, 24 F. Supp. 414 (D. Md. 1938).
39. United States v. Bialoglowski, 21 F. Supp. 613 (S.D. Cal. 1938) ; cf. United
States v. Marini, 16 F. Supp. 963 (S.D. N. Y. 1937). See 45 STAT. 1512 (1929), 8
U. S. C. A. § 377b (Supp. 1939).
4o. United States v. Thind, 261 U. S. 204 (1923).
41. See cases collected supra note ii.
42. United States v. Gokhale, 26 F. (2d) 36o (C. C. A. 2d, 1928).

43. United States v. Plaistow, 189 Fed. ioo6 (W. D. N. Y. igio) presents a very

interesting situation. Under the Act, one who has served an enlistment can petition,
upon honorable discharge, without filing a declaration of intent. Applicant was hon-

orably discharged before the completion of regular enlistment. The court found that

this was illegally procured.
44. United States v. Ginsburg, 243 U. S.472 (1917). But see United States v.
Stoller, i8o Fed. 91o (E. D. Wash. igio).

45 ."
Courts are without authority to sanction changes or modifications; their duty
is rigidly to enforce the legislative will in respect of a matter so vital to the public welfare." Id. at 474.
46. United States v. Richmond, 17 F. (2d) 28 (C. C. A. 3d, 1927). Here the
judge left the court room during the proceedings and entered an adjoining court room
to hear another case. The examination of petitioner was performed by the court clerk.
47. United States v. Leles, 227 Fed. 189 (N. D. Cal. 1915).
48. United States v. Nisbet, 168 Fed. 1005 (W. D. Wash. i9og).

Here the court
allowed depositions under Section io, whereas the witnesses did not qualify under this
section, being residents of the state of naturalization court.
49. United States v. Olaechea, 293 Fed. 8i (D. Nev. 1923).
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tive. These cases impose harsh requirements upon the petitioner for it
makes him liable for errors beyond his power of control. Fortunately, the
problem has more or less vanished because, under a 1926 amendment, there
is no necessity for examination of petitioner nor his witnesses in open court
representative who has recomwhere they have been examined by a Bureau,
50
mended to. the court that they be admitted.
e. Deviations From Time Requirements
5
Adherence to the time requirements imposed upon aliens by the Act '
that
held
been
has
it
Thus,
enforced.
rigidly
rule,
general
have been, as a
the failure to wait two years between the date of the declaration of intention
and the date of filing of the petition renders the certificate issued thereunder
illegally obtained.5 2 The same result was reached where the failure consisted in allowing more than seven years to expire between the time of dec"
laration and filing of petition, ' and this even though the lapse of time was
applicant.54 This rule was held applicable
the
due to innocent errors by
even'though the declaration of intention had been filed prior to the passage
5
of the present act.55 United States v. Salomon, " moved to a great extent
by the particular facts of the case, held that it was not a fatal defect where
the court clerk erred in failing to allow ninety days to expire between date
of petition and date of hearing. Examined in the light of the importance of
the ninety-day period (it is important in that it gives the Naturalization
Bureau a chance to examine the petitioner's qualification), the case seems
clearly out of line with the general rule.
f. Failure to File Certificate of Arrival
Failure to file the certificate of arrival as a part of the petition 57 has
58
This
been held to render the certificate of citizenship illegally procured.
has been extended to cover the situation where, by a nunc pro tunc order,
the court has permitted the petitioner to attach it to the petition at the hearing.5 9 The result is not surprising, for the certificate of arrival gives the
Naturalization Bureau a chance to investigate the applicant. However,
where this required information is supplied by other papers, it would seem
60
that the courts should permit the nunc pro tunc order to suffice.
g. Other Situations
Under the Act of 19o6, the applicant had to renounce allegiance to all
foreign governments, and particularly, by name, to the head of the govern50. 44 STAT. 709 (1927), 8 U. S. C. A. § 399a (Supp. 1939).
51. Sec. 4 (I) and (2).
52. United States v. Van Der Molen, 163 Fed. 65o (W. D. Mich. 19o8). Although
the petition was filed prior to the expiration of the two-year period, hearing on it was
not had until two-year period had elapsed. Naturalization court felt that this two-year
period was to run from date of declaration to date of hearing. This was held "illegally
procured."
53. United States v. Lecka, 7 F. (2d) 380 (D. Tenn. 1924).
54. United States v. Mueller, 246 Fed. 679 (C. C. A. 8th, 1917). Here applicant
filed his petition twice, but on both occasions he was in the wrong jurisdiction.
55. United States v. Morena, 245 U. S. 392 (ii8).
56. United States v. Salomon, 231 Fed. 928 (C. C. A. 5th, I9x6).
57. Sec. 4 (2).
58. United States v. Maney, 278 U. S. 17 (1928); United States v. Ness, 245
U. S. 319 (1917); United States v. Vujnovic, 12 F. Supp. 208 (W. D. N. Y. 1935);
United States v. Starnack, 6 F. (2d) 334 (W. D. Wash. 1925).
59. United States v. Maney, 278 U. S. 17 (1928).
6o. 40 CONG. REc. 7036, 7037 (19o6). Here it is stated that the most important
reason for requiring the certificate of arrival is to establish the date of arrival to prevent persons from taking advantage of the position of aliens entering prior to their
attaining the age of eighteen.
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ment of which he was then a citizen.8 ' Owing to errors by court clerks,
several applicants renounced specifically to the wrong government in their
declarations of intent.8 2 The oath, however, was correctly made at the
hearing. Faced with the possibility that to rule that these certificates were
illegally procured would mean that every time an alien's present government
would change, either by war or by death, the alien would have to re-declare,
the courts ruled that these certificates were valid. The rationale was that
the declaration of intent merely contemplated a future act and the doing of
the act, in a correct manner, remedied the defect.63 Under a recent amendment, the renunciation must be merely to "any foreign prince, potentate,
state, or sovereignty . . ." (Italics supplied). 4
In United States v. Gulliken 65 the court allowed the petitioner to substitute a witness for one of his prior witnesses who had been ruled incompetent. This change occurred at the hearing on the petition. The applicant,
in United States v. Erickson 6 changed a witness prior to the hearing. In
neither case were the affidavits sent to the Bureau of Naturalization. The
former case allowed cancellation; the latter refused it. Factually, however,
the cases can be reconciled, for in the Erickson case the authorities had
ample time to investigate the qualifications of the witness, whereas the
other case presented no such opportunity since the change occurred at the
hearing.
United States v. Olsen67 presents a novel situation. After making
affidavits to the effect that they felt that the petitioner was fully qualified
for citizenship, the witnesses modified this at the hearing by saying that he
was qualified in all respects save one, i. e., he had participated in a strike.
After a thorough investigation, the naturalization judge felt that their
opinion concerning the alien's qualifications was founded on hearsay and
therefore the applicant should be admitted. Cancellation was permitted, the
court ruling that the testimony of the witnesses must be unequivocal, unless
their reasons for qualifying the testimony is entirely groundless or whimsical. The rule seems to set up a factual test, and, since the naturalization
court found as a fact that the grounds for the qualified statement were
groundless, the result in this case seems contradictory to the rule they
advocate.
II. "FRAUDULENTLY PROCURED"
Although the cases often fail to draw a clear line between "illegally procured" and "fraudulently procured", there is a rather clear distinction underlying these cases. A certificate is illegally procured where the defect was
either in the failure of the applicant or the court to follow the technical
requirements of the statute, or where, after complete disclosure of all facts,
the court has "erred" in its fact finding or has applied the wrong law. The
fraud cases, on the other hand, are cases where the applicant intentionally
deceived the court by lying, or where he, intentionally or unintentionally,
misrepresents certain facts or fails to present certain required facts to the
court.

6i. Sec. 2 (3).
62. United States v. Orend, 221 Fed. 777 (W. D. Pa. 1915); United States v.
Viaropulos, 221 Fed. 485 (W. D. Pa. i915).
63. Id. at 492.
64. 53 STAT. 844 (1939), 8 U. S. C. A. §381 (Supp. 1939).
65. United States v. Guliken, 244 Fed. 727 (C. C. A. 8th, i917).
66. United States v. Erickson, 188 Fed. 747 (W. D. Mich. 19lo).
67. United States v. Olsen, 272 Fed. 7o6 (W. D. Wash. 192i).
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a. Intentional Misrepresentation and Non-disclosure of Facts
Where the applicant intentionally fails to present facts, or intentionally
misrepresents facts, the courts usually allow cancellation, even though a full
and honest disclosure would not have made the applicant ineligible. 6 Typical cases are: (a) where the applicant was guilty of a crime or conduct not
consistent with his statement that he was a man of good moral conduct,69
(b) where the applicant falsely stated that he was not married, 0 or that
he was not a believer in polygamy whereas he was then practicing it,7 1 (c)

where he misrepresents information, such as address, name, etc.72 Several
cases have arisen involving applicants who, although professing belief in our
government, were anarchists. 73 It is interesting to note that in these cases
involving alien anarchists and alien polygamists the courts have always
placed them on grounds of fraud,
although both types of aliens are specifi74
cally excluded under the act.
b. Subsequent Acts as Evidence of PriorMental State
To prevent the acquisition of citizenship where the alien merely wished
to acquire the status and then return to his native country, Section 15 provided that, "If any alien who shall have secured a certificate of citizenship
under the provisions of this chapter shall, within five years after the issuance
of such certificate, return to the country of his nativity, or go to any other
foreign country, and take permanent residence therein, it shall be considered prima facie evidence of a lack of intention on the part of such alien to
become a permanent citizen of the United States at the time of filing his
application for citizenship, and, in the absence of countervailing evidence,
it shall be sufficient in the proper proceedings to authorize the cancellation
of his certificate of citizenship as fraudulent . . ." This section has been
interpreted as rule of evidence and not a matter of substantive rights, 75 and
is a rebuttable presumption.7 0 The cases have, as a general rule, refused
cancellation except in clear cases.7 7 The case of United States v. Knight 78
68. United States v. Marcus, i F. Supp. 29 (D. N. J. 1932). In United States v.
Saracino, 43 F. (2d) 76 (C. C. A. 3d, 193o), the court cancelled the certificate as
fraudulently procured even though the fraud was at a preliminary hearing and not in
open court.
69. United States v. Mancini, 29 F. Supp. 44 (W. D. Pa. 1939) ; United States v.
Raverat, 222 Fed. ioi8 (D. Mont. 1915) ; United States v. Etheridge, 41 F. (2d) 762
(D. Ore. 193o). In the last-named case, the applicant attempted to argue that since
the alleged crime had occurred prior to the five-year period, it was not fraud. The
court said it must be presented with all the facts in order that it may ascertain the
question of whether, for a five-year period preceding citizenship, the applicant was a
man of good moral conduct.
70. United States v. Rutman, 27 F. Supp. 891 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) (common-law
marriage); United States v. Marcus, i F. Supp. 29 (D. N. Y. 1932).
71. United States v. Kichin, 276 Fed. 818 (E. D. Mo. 1921).
72. United States v. Perez, 29 F. Supp. 888 (E.D. N. Y. 194o) ; United States v.

Goglia, 21 F. Supp. 894 (S.D. N. Y. 1938) ; United States v. DiBlasi, i F. Supp. 28
(D.N. J. 1932).
73. United States v. Stuppiello, 26o Fed. 483 (W. D. N. Y. 1919) ; United States
v. Swelgin, 254 Fed. 884 (D.Ore. 1918) ; Olsson v. United States, 201 Fed. 1022 (C.
C. A. 8th, 1913).

74. Sec. 7. See pp. 846-847 supra.
75. United States v. Luria, 231 U. S. 9 (1913) ; United States v. Grenfeld, 34 F.

(2d) 349 (S.D. Tex. 1929).
76. Ibid.
77. United States v. Perrone, 26 F. (2d) 213 (C. C. A. 3d, 1928); Rothman v.
United States, 18 F. (2d) 577 (C. C. A. 6th, 1927) ; United States v. Jurick, 16 F.
Supp. 32 (E. D. N. Y. 1936).
78. United States v. Knight, 291 Fed. 129 (D. Mont. 1923), aff'd, 299 Fed. 571
(C. C. A. 9th, 1924).
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illustrates the limit to which the court will go in rebutting the presumption.
Here the absence, which commenced one year after naturalization, was for
a twenty year period, yet the court refused the government's petition. The
court gives us a test which, although vague, will allow courts a great deal
of latitude in rebutting the presumption."
A group of cases arose after the World War in which the government
argued that the sympathy shown by ex-Germans towards their former
country who was then at war with the United States was evidence of their
lack of complete renuncation of allegiance at the time of their naturalization
and therefore fraudulent. Courts accepted this and as a result many cancellations followed.80 Although not aided by any presumption here, the
courts were not as lenient here as under the presumption raised by
Section 15.

A dissent in Turlej v. United States "I would restrict the applicability
of subsequent acts as evidence of prior intent. Although admitting that
subsequent acts were evidence, the dissent, in a case involving commission
of crimes after naturalization, stated that this could not give rise to any
presumption because to hold so would make the real basis for fraud "not
fraud committed on the state court, but the offense committed by the applicant subsequent to his8 2naturalization." A very recent case quoted and
approved this language.
The extension of the use of subsequent acts as evidence of prior intent
has been urged in the cases involving disbelievers in our form of government. Although adhering to the general doctrine that subsequent acts
may show prior state of mind, 3 the cases have refused to find fraud unless
the facts were very clear.84
c. Unintentional Misrepresentationor Concealment of Facts
Where the applicant has innocently misrepresented or concealed facts,
the courts will generally adopt a lenient attitude towards the applicant and
refuse to cancel the certificate."' United States v. Petrucci86 serves as a
good example of this tendency. Petrucci remarried without divorcing his
first wife and later, at the hearing, testified that he was not a believer in
79. 291 Fed. 129, 133. The court suggests a distinction between cases: (a) where
there is a present intent to return not based on some future event, (b) where there is
merely a present hope which is dependent upon a future state of mind. Only the second situation falls under the presumption.
8o. Schurmann v. United States, 264 Fed. 917 (C. C. A. 9th, 1920), aff'd per curiam,
257 U. S. 621 (1922) ; United States v. Kramer, 262 Fed. 395 (C. C. A. 5th, 1919) ;
United States v. Herberger, 272 Fed. 278 (W. D. Wash. 1921) ; United States v. Darmer, 249 Fed. 989 (S. D. Wash. ii8) (thirty years intervened between naturalization
and alleged acts showing prior intent) ; United States v. Wursterbarth, 249 Fed. go8
(D. N. J. 1918) (thirty-six years intervened here). Cf. United States v. Woerndle,
288 Fed. 47 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923).
81. Turlej v. United States, 31 F. (2d) 696, 699 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
82. United States v. Tedesco, 31 F. Supp. 322 (S. D. N. Y. 1940).
83. Glaser v. United States, 289 Fed. 255 (C. C. A. 7th, 1923), cert. denied, 263

U. S. 700 (1923).

84. Rowan v. United States, iS F.

(2d) 246 (C. C. A. 9th, 1927) ; United States
F. (2d) 942 (E. D. Mich. 1926). Cf. United States v. Tapolesanyi, 40
F. (2d) 255 (C. C. A. 3d, I93O).
85. United States v. Petrucci, 23 F. Supp. 687 (M. D. Pa. 1938) ; United States
v. Vujnovic, 12 F. Supp. 208 (W. D. N. Y. 1935). Although this unintentional concealment or misrepresentation of facts is not fraud as we have viewed it in other
branches of the law, it is referred to as fraud in these cancellation cases on the theory

v. Rovin,

12

that the failure of the applicant to reveal these facts has deprived the court of its right
to recommend or reject the alien on the basis of a review of all the facts relevant to the

applicant's qualifications.
86. 23 F. Supp. 687 (M. D. Pa. 1938).
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polygamy. The court held it was not fraud since it was a perfectly innocent
concealment, applicant being under the impression that his first marriage
had been dissolved by the wife's conviction on the crime of infanticide of an
illegitimate child. It is interesting to note that this result was obtained
despite the fact that a complete revelation by the applicant might exclude
him from citizenship because of his polygamous marriage, for, although
marriage dissolved, our rules do
his native land's customs considered the
7
not recognize this type of dissolution.
CONCLUSION

Any suggestions towards elimination of the confusion in the illegally
procured situation must depend upon consideration of policy, national or
administrative. Certainly the courts should not lend a helping hand to the
administrative body where its action is purely vexatious. An administrative
policy, favoring the use of appeals rather than relying completely upon a
direct attack under Sec. 15, would remove hardships as well as the conflict.
Where the illegality consists of a failure to apply the correct law, or where
it consists of a fact finding which the Bureau feels is unwarranted, the
proper administrative policy should be an immediate appeal. The privilege
of citizenship, once granted to an alien and cherished by him, should not be
swept away from him, some twenty or thirty years later, by a court which,
acting under Sec. 15, disagrees with the naturalization court's application
of law or finding of fact. The remedy provided by Sec. 15 should be used
only where it is a pure jurisdictional defect, i. e., where the person naturalized was excluded by the Act, or, where the illegality was the subornation
of the applicant.
The fraud situation is much easier, for here there is not the problem of
defining terms that we encounter in the illegally procured cases. Here,
more so than in the other cases, a judicial policy based on considerations
of the applicant's desirability as a citizen, can serve as a check on the hardships to the applicant whose certificate is being cancelled.
I. Intentional frauds: Here the tendency is to cancel the certificate even though the concealed or misrepresented fact would not have
led to a denial of citizenship. This tendency might well be termed
prophylactic. Its justification lies in the fact that the naturalization
court should not be denied its right to examine all facts.
2. Unintentional Concealments: Here the situation might be
cleared up by making cancellation dependent upon whether the fact,
which was innocently concealed or misrepresented, would have led to
denial of citizenship had it been correctly stated.
3. Subsequent Acts as Fraud: The tendency here is to demand a
clear case in order that the government's petition be sustained. If any
presumptions are to be drawn, let them be drawn by the legislature and
not the courts. The competency of the subsequent act should always be
regarded as merely evidence of a pre-existing state of mind and not as
conclusive, for otherwise the basis of fraud becomes the subsequent act
and not the misrepresentation to the court.
G. F. DiB.
87. See cases cited mipra notes 71 and

72.
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The Effect of a Pre-Existing Disease on the Right to Recover Under
an Accident Policy or the Double Indemnity Provisions of a
Life Insurance Policy *
In their accident and double indemnity life policies, insurance companies
usually undertake to insure against death or losses occurring "as a result,
directly and independently of all other causes, of bodily injuries effected
solely through external, violent and accidental means".1 A serious problem
concerning the interpretation of the words "directly and independently of
all other causes" arises when an accident befalls an insured who has a preexisting condition of disease or bodily weakness, when neither the condition nor the accident would alone have caused the death. The decisions
of the courts faced with the present problem are far from harmonious, and
often in outright conflict.
The problem is further complicated by an additional clause which many
companies have inserted in an effort to avoid liability as a result of opinions
based solely upon an interpretation of the insuring clause mentioned above.
It is normally in the form of a proviso specifying that no payments will be
made under the policy if the death is "the result of . . . or caused by or
contributed to directly or indirectly or wholly or partially by disease or by
bodily or mental infirmity". 2 Although this additional term was inserted in
the policy in an effort to reach some consistency in the holdings of the cases,
it has apparently done little more than add to the confusion.8
On each side of the controversy, there are certain well defined and
uncontroverted rules of law. A brief restatement of these dogmas will help
to define the present issue, and will indicate the extent of the problem. In
the first place, it is evident that if the disease, and not the accident, was the
proximate or substantial cause of the death of the insured, there can be no
recovery under these clauses since death would not then be caused by the
accident directly and independently of all other causes. 4 On the other hand,
if the accident caused the death independently of the disease, it is an equally
obvious proposition that the insurance company should be held liable on its
contract.' A third situation in which the courts are unanimous in their
holdings arises when the accident causes a disease which was not present in
the insured before the accident, and which in turn causes the death or disability under the policy. The courts have regarded this as a direct chain of
* This paper proceeds upon the assumption that the original injury is caused by
accidental means. For a discussion of the problem of determining whether the injury
is caused by an accident see Note (1930) 78 U. or PA. L. REV. 762.
i. Although the terms of the policy issued by various companies may vary, this
provision is a representative one. It is the insuring clause as issued by the Prudential
Insurance Company. See Kelly v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 334 Pa. 143, 145, 6 A. (2d)
55, 56 (1939). For the standard form of policy in New York, see N. Y. Is. LAW
(1939) § 155 (life insurance), § 164 (accident and health insurance).
2. This is the proviso as it is stated in the policy of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., which was litigated in Budzinsky v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 287 Mich.
495, 497, 283 N. W. 662, 663 (i939), rev'd on rehearing,287 Mich. 495, 286 N. W. 842
('939).
3. See p. 856 hnfra.
4. Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Selden, 78 Fed. 285 (C. C. A. 4th, 1897); Johnson
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 24 Ga. App. 43r, ioi S. E. 134 (1919); Prudential Ins. Co. v.
v.
Gaines, 27r Ky. 496, 112 S. W. (2d) 666 (1938); Frerichs v. London & Lancashire
Indem. Co., I69 La. 182, 124 So. 821 (1925); 5 Coucnr, Cyc. oF IN s. LAW (1929)
4005; VANCE, INSURAN CE (2d ed. 1930) 880.
5. Clarke v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., i8o Cal. 76, 179 Pac. i95 (1919) ; National
Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Upchurch, 57 Ga. App. 399, i95 S. E. 588 (938) ; Home Ben.
Ass'n v. Smith, I6 S. W. (2d) 357 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Hicks, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 74, 56 S. W. 87 (Ioo) ; see Michener v. Fidelity & Cas. Co.,
200 Ia. 476, 478, 203 N. W. 14, I5 (1925).
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causation set in motion by the accident, and have therefore held the companies liable without any hesitation. These, then, are the firmly established
rules, but as soon as the operative facts of the particular case are carried
beyond their limits, the present issue is presented squarely.
The first time that an American court was clearly faced with this7
problem was in the case of National Masonic Accident Ass'n v. Shryock,
which has since gained recognition as a leading case for the doctrine that
there can be no recovery against the insurer when the injury and disease
act concurrently to cause death. In interpreting the policy, which contained
the usual insuring clause with the proviso excepting the risks of disease,
Judge Sanborn stated the rule in these words:
"If he [the insured] sustained an accident, but at the time it
occurred he was suffering from a pre-existing disease or bodily infirmity, but he died because the accident aggravated the effects of the
disease, or the disease aggravated the effects of the accident, the express
contract was that the association should not be liable for the amount of
the insurance. The death in such a case . . . would be caused partly
by the disease and partly by the accident, and the contract expressly
exempted the association from liability therefor." s
The doctrine that there could be no recovery against the insurer was apparently not limited to the situation, as in the Shryock case, where the policy
expressly excepted disease as a risk. Subsequent cases have established the
principle that there can be no recovery under the standard insuring clause
alone, even when the disease clause is not included in the terms of the policy.
They reason that the death in this situation could not be regarded as having
been caused "solely and exclusively" 9 by the accident when it was brought
about partly by the accident and partly by the disease.10 A recapitulation
shows that a slight majority of the states adhere to this rule, and deny
recovery as a matter of law on these facts."6. De Blieux v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 185 La. 62o, 170 So. 14 (1936) ; Malvihill v.
Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 221 App. 494, 224 N. Y. Supp. 644 (1927), aff'd, 248 N. Y.
524, 162 N. E. 51o (1928) ; 6 COOLEY, BRIEFs ON INSURANCE (2d ed. 1928) 5345; 5
COUCH, CYc. OF INS. LAW 4OO6; VANCE, INSURANCE 881, and cases there cited.
7- 73 Fed. 774 (C. C. A. 8th, 1896). To the extent that they purported to apply
federal substantive law to these operative facts, all federal decisions prior to 1938 are
subject to limitation under the rule of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
8. Id. at 775-776.
9- In Hall v. General Acc. Assur. Co., 16 Ga. App. 66, 74, 85 S. E. 6oo, 604 (915),
the court pointed out that it makes no difference whether the policy is worded "independently of all other causes" or "solely and exclusively" caused by the accident. The
court said: "If a cause operates to produce an effect independently of all other causes,
it is the sole and exclusive cause of that effect, and the result accrues solely and exclusively from that cause."
io. Preferred Accident Ins. Co. of New York v. Combs, 76 F. (2d) 775 (C. C. A.
8th, 1935) ; Ryan v. Continental Casualty Co., 47 F. (2d) 472 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931 ) ;
Kerns v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 291 Fed. 289 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923); Aetna Life Ins. Co.
v. Ryan, 255 Fed. 483 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Morrow, 213
Fed. 599 (C. C. A. 3d, 1914) ; Stanton v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 83 Conn. 708, 78 Atl 317
(191o) ; Crandall v. Continental Casualty Co., 179 Ill. App. 330 (1913); Leland v.
Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 233 Mass. 558, 124 N. E. 517
(1919) ; Penn v. Standard Life Ins. Co., 158 N. C. 29, 73 S. E. 99 (x9), petition for
rehearing dismissed, i6o N. C. 399, 76 S. E. 262 (1912) ; Worley v. International Travelers' Assurance Co., iio S. W. (2d) I2O2 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) ; Clark v. Employers' Liability Assurance Co., 72 Vt. 458, 48 Atl. 639 (9oo); Cretney v. Woodmen
Accident Co., 196 Wis. 29, 219 N. W. 448 (1928). See Frerichs v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co. of America, 169 La. 182, 124 So. 821 (1929) ; Thomas v. Fidelity
& Casualty Co., io6 Md. 299, 67 Atl. 259 (1907) ; North American Accident Ins. Co.
v. Miller, 193 S. W. 750 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
ii. In addition to the cases cited note 1O supra, the following cases denied recoverj
against the insurer when the policy contained the proviso excepting the risks of dis-
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A second body of authority has grown up which is the exact opposite
of the above majority view. Jurisdictions advancing this proposition allow
a recovery on these facts as a matter of law. 12 The courts advocating this
theory reason that if the accident accelerates death, which otherwise might
have been delayed for a considerable time, then it must be held to be the
sole and exclusive cause of the death, despite the concurrence of the disease
in causing the fatality. 3 Although this principle has been advocated consistently by several courts, 14 it has never achieved any large degree of
popularity.
A sizeable number of states, although not numerically sufficient to constitute a majority, adhere to an alternative doctrine. These jurisdictions
permit a recovery against the insurer under the standard insuring clause
despite the presence of a disease at the time of the accident and its contribution in part to the fatal result, so long as the accident was the proximate
cause of the death and the disease was no more than the remote cause.' 5 If
ease: Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Loeb, 107

F. (2d) 7 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939);
Brown v. Maryland Casualty Co., 55 F. (2d) 159 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932) ; Illinois Commercial Men's Ass'n v. Parks, 179 Fed. 794 (C. C. A. 7th, 191o) ; Kellner v. Travelers'

Ins. Co., i8o Cal. 326, 181 Pac. 61 (1919); Binder v. Nat'l Masonic Accident Ass'n,
127 Ia. 25, lO2 N. W. igo (1905) ; De Blieux v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 185 La. 619, 170
So. I4 (1936) ; Bouchard v. Prudential Ins. Co., 135 Me. 238, 194 Atl. 405 (1937);
Budzinski v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 287 Mich. 495, 283 N. W. 662 (939), rev'd on

rehearing, 287 Mich. 495, 286 N. W. 842 (1939) ; White v. Standard Life & Accident
Ins. Co., 95 Minn. 77, 103 N. W. 735 (9o5) ; Sullivan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,

96 Mont. 254, 29 P. (2d) 1046 (1934) ; Runyon v. Commonwealth Casualty Co., 9
N. J. Misc. 487, 154 At. 397 (Sup. Ct. 193), rev'd, 1O9 N. J. L. 238, i6o Atl. 402
(1932) ; McQuade v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 166 Misc. 524, 2 N. Y. S. (2d)

647 (Munic. Ct. 1938); Railway Mail Ass'n v. Weir, 24 Ohio App. 5, 156 N. E. 921
(1927)
(but query the exact positiori of the Ohio court in view of the Thrush case
infra note 18) ; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Glass, 29 Tex. Civ. App. 159, 67 S. W. io62
(1902); Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n v. Ryder, 166 Va. 446, 185 S. E. 894
(1936). See Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, iS Tenn. App. 452, 472, 79
S. W. (2d) 292, 304 (I934) ; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Hicks, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 74, 78,
56 S. W. 87, 9o (igoo); 6 COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 6, at 5300.
12. Benefit Ass'n of Ry. Employees v. Armbruster, 217 Ala. 282, 116 So. 164

(1928) ; Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Hoehn, 215 Ala. IO9, 1I0 So. 7 (1926), (1927) 25
MIcH. L. REv. 803; National Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Shibley, 192 Ark. 53, 9o S. W.
(2d) 766 (1936); Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Meyer, lo6 Ark. gi, 152 S. W. 995
(1912) ; Hooper v. Standard Life & Acc. Ins. Co., i66 Mo. App. 209, 148 S. W. 116
(1912) ; Fetter v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 174 Mo. 256, 73 S. W. 592 (1903) ; cf.

Sturm v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., 212 IlL. App. 354 (1918) ; Moon v. Order
of United Commercial Tranvelers of America, 96 Neb. 65, 146 N. W. 1037 (1914).
13. A typical expression of this view is found in Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Meyer,
io6 Ark. 91, g6, 152 S. W. 995, 997 (19I2), where the court said: "The effect of this
instruction [of the trial court] was to make the company liable under the contract, if
the death resulted when it did on account of the aggravation of the disease from the
accidental injury even though death from the disease might have resulted at a later
period, regardless of the injury. We are of the opinion that that is the correct interpretation of the contract, for if the injury, by aggravating the disease, accelerated the
death of the assured, then it resulted 'directly, independently and exclusively of all
other causes'."
14. It is interesting to note that in every case reaching this result, the proviso excepting the risks of disease was absent. In several of the cases, there is an indication
that the court might have denied liability if such a clause were present. In the only
case in these jurisdictions which involved a disease clause, the court allowed a recovery,
basing their reasoning on a finding that the insured was suffering from a disorder or
weakness, rather than a disease. See Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. McCombs, 88

Ark. 52, 64 S. W. (2d) 333 (1933).

I5. Patterson v. Ocean Acc. & Guar. Corp., 25 App. D. C. 46 (i9o5) ; Jones v.
General Acc., Fire and Life Assur. Corp., 118 Fla. 648, I59 So. 804 (1935) ; Hall v.
General Acc. Assur. Corp., 16 Ga. App. 66, 85 S. E. 6oo (1915) ; Continental Casualty
Co. v. Lloyd, I65 Ind. 52, 73 N. E. 824 (9o5) ; Inter-Ocean Cas. Co. v. Wilkins, o6
Ind. App. 231, 182 N. E. 252 (1932); Licklieder v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n,
184 Ia. 423, 168 N. W. 884 (i918), (1919) 3 A. L. R. 1304; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
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it can be shown, however, that the disease was the substantial, or proximate
cause of the fatality, a recovery can be defeated. 16 In substance, the jurisdictions adhering to this rule read the clause that the injury must produce
death "directly and independently of all other causes" '. to require that the
accidental injury be the proximate cause of the loss. In other words, so
long as the accident was the force that excited the disease or condition into
activity so that the demise of the insured followed naturally and directly,
which would not have happened but for the injury, there can be a recovery
on the policy. This reasoning has been used to reach the conclusion of liability on the part of the insurer even under the familiar provision that the
insurer shall not be liable for the consequences of a pre-existing disease.' s
This rather cursory examination of the authorities indicates that one
factor can be eliminated as irrelevant and merely adding further confusion.
That is the proviso exempting losses caused directly or indirectly, in whole
or part by disease. Although some of the courts which permitted a recovery
against the insurer did so because there was no exception in the policy of
the risks attendant to disease, and indicated by dictum that their decision
would have been different if such a clause were present, 19 and several courts
have denied recovery solely because such a clause was contained in the
policy,20 the better reasoned cases have indicated that the proviso should be
of no practical significance. 2 ' This was emphasized in striking tones by the
Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Kerns v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co., 22 in which recovery was had on a policy not containing the proviso
v. Williams, 18o Miss. 894, 178 So. 477 (1938); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v.
Hood, 124 Miss. 548, 87 So. 133 (1921) ; Wheeler v. Fid. & Cas. Co., 298 Mo. 619, 251
S. W. 924 (1923) ; Modern Woodmen Acc. Ass'n v. Shryock, 54 Neb. 250, 74 N. W.
607 (I898), in which case the decision in National Masonic Acc. Ass'n v. Shryock, 73
Fed. 774 (C. C. A. 8th, 1896), reaching an opposite result, was criticised harshly;
Langeberg v. Interstate Bus. Men's Ass'n, 57 S. D. 226, 231 N. W. 930 (1930), (1931)
26 ILL. L. Ray. 344; Kearney v. Washington Nat. Ins. Co., 184 Wash. 579, 52 P. (2d)
903 (1936) ; Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Gratiot, 45 Wyo. I, 14 P. (2d) 438, 82 A. L.
R. 1411 (1932).

16. This dogma is stated most clearly in Thornton v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 1x6 Ga.
S. E. 287, 290 (19o2).

121, 130, 42

17. See note 9 mpra.

18. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Young, E. D. Pa., Feb. 14, 1940; Scanlan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 93 F. (2d) 942 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937) ; Miller v. Fid. & Cas. Co., 97
Fed. 836 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1899) ; Thornton v. Travelers' Life Ins. Co., I16 Ga. 121,
42 S. E. 287 (1902) ; Rebenstorf v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 299 Ill. App. 71, 19
N. E. (2d) 420 (ig39); Rieger v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., iio S. W. (2d) 878 (Mo.
App. 1937); United States Cas. Co. v. Thrush, 21 Ohio App. 129, 152 N. E. 796
(1926), (1927) 25 MIcir. L. Rav. 467; Lee v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 95 Utah 445, 82 P.
(2d) '178(1937) ; Browning v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 94 Utah 532, 72 P. (2d)
lo6O, rehearing denied, 94 Utah 570, 80 P. (2d) 348 (1937).
19. Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Hoehn, 215 Ala. 1O9, 110 So. 7 (1926), (1927) 25
Micir. L. Ray. 8o3; Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Meyer, io6 Ark. 91, 152 S. W. 995 (1912);
Patterson v. Ocean Acc. & Guar. Co., 25 App. D. C. 46 (19o5) ; Jones v. General Acc.
Fire & Life Ins. Co., 118 Fla. 648, 159 So. 804 (1935) ; cf. Home Ben. Ass'n v. Smith,
16 S. W. (2d) 357 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
2o. National Masonic Acc. Ass'n v. Shryock, 73 Fed. 774 (C. C. A. 8th, i896);
Binder v. Nat'l Masonic Acc. Ass'n, 127 Ia. 25, 102 N. W. 19o (1905) ; Budzinski v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 287 Mich 495, 283 N. W. 662, ree/d on rehearing,287 Mich.
495, 286 N. W. 842 (939
; see Christianson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 102 S. W.
(2d) 682, 684 (Mo. App. 1937), note however, the limitation placed on this case by
Killam v. Travelers' Protective Ass'n of America, 127 S. W. (2d) 772, 779 (Mo. App.
1939).
21. Kerns v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 291 Fed. 289 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923); Crandall v.
Continental Cas. Co., 179 Ill. App. 330 (1913) ; Penn v. Standard Life Ins. Co., 158
N. C. 29, 73 S. E. 99 (1911), rehearing denied, i6o N. C. 399, 76 S. E. 262 (1912) ;
Lee v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 82 P. (2d) 178 (Utah, 1939). See CoRxuius, AcCIDENTAL
MEANS (1917) 100.
22. 291 Fed. 289

(C. C. A. 8th, 1923).
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exempting the risks of disease. In its opinion, the court stated that it made
no difference whether the policy contained the proviso or not, saying:
"The language used in the policy before us, by limiting liability
to cases of death, wherein such death is caused by accident directly and
independently of all other causes, just as certainly and effectually excludes liability in a case wherein the accident co-operates with a preexisting disease or bodily infirmity, as it would if the latter were set
out in the policy." 23
The logic supporting this view seems inescapable. By the stipulation that
the accident should be the sole, exclusive, direct cause, independent of all
other causes, the policy on its face excludes effectually any loss which is
caused wholly or partly, directly or indirectly by disease, because then the
accident could no longer be considered as the cause independent of all
others.2 4 The mere fact that the policy includes the specific exception, in
addition to the general provisions of the insuring clause, which appear to
cover the field adequately, should not be seized on as a means. of finding
liability on the policy, if it were not so found under the insuring clause alone.
It is submitted that the proviso is inserted in the policy simply to
emphasize and clarify, by a more specific enumeration of possible causes,
the language of the insuring clause to the effect that the death must result
from "bodily injuries, effected directly and independently of all other causes
from accidental means". 25 Further, the policy has reference to the cause,
not to the effect of the accident. 2 This point is illustrated by the fact that
the clause is usually associated with a series of other restrictions on the
coverage of the policy stating that there will be no liability on the part of
the insurer for injuries or death resulting from participation in the army or
navy, or from activities in a war or riot, and so on. Since the clause is
included as one of the items in this enumeration, it is reasonable to conclude,
as some courts 27 and at least one legal writer2 have done, that this is the
basic reason for the insertion of the proviso into the policy.
For the present purpose, then, the clause is of no importance except in
so far as it has imported further confusion into an already confused branch
of law. The law can be understood more readily if the shadowy distinctions
based on the presence or absence of this "redundant clause" 29 are overlooked, and if judicial attention is directed to an interpretation of the insuring clause alone. In the subsequent discussion, therefore, this clause will
uniformly be treated as surplusage. With this point clear, the investigation
of the authorities can proceed.
There are many cases in which a strict adherence to the majority rule
would work a substantial hardship on the beneficiaries, for, by a rigorous
23. Id. at 292.
24. In this connection, note the language of the Utah court in Lee v. N. Y. Life
Ins. Co., 82 P. (2d) 178 at 178 (1939) : "It is evident that if the death of the insured
resulted 'directly and independently of all other causes from bodily injury effected
solely through external, violent and accidental cause' then it could not have resulted
from 'physical or mental infirmity; or directly or indirectly from illness or disease of
any kind'."
25. De Blietu v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 185 La. 62o, 170 So. 14 (936).
26. Carr v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., ioo Mo. App. 602, 75 S. W. ISo (1903);
Clark v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Co., 72 Vt. 458, 48 Atl. 639 (Igoo) ; 6 COOLEY, op.
cit. mtpra note 6, at 5299, 5344. Contra: Winspear v. The Accident Ins. Co., 6 Q. D.
D. 42 (i88o) ; Lawrence v. The Accident Ins. Co., 7 Q. B. D. 216 (i88i). The latter
case was expressly disapproved of in the case of Carr v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co.
27. Rieger v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., IIo S. W. (2d) 878 (Mo. App. 1937).
28. CORNELIus, ACCDENTAL MEANS (1917) pp. 27-35, has a complete discussion
of the early authorities on this point.
29. As it was dubbed by CORNELIUS, id. at ioo.
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application of its requirements, they would be deprived of all payments
under the policy. The courts have naturally been reluctant to strip the
dependents of the insured of the benefits of his policy, thus making the policy
worthless in many cases where an injury resulting from an accident was the
efficient cause of death. This feeling of reluctance has been manifested in

the holdings of several states, which, though purporting to apply the majority rule, relax considerably the harshness of its application.
The first of these modifications is to be found in Massachusetts. The
courts of that commonwealth profess to follow the majority view but have
in fact modified it so that they will not permit recovery against the insurer
when the insured had a disease at the time of the accident, and the injury
merely aggravated it. If, however, there was only a weakness present from
a former affliction with a disease from which the insured had apparently
made a complete recovery, the fact that the accidental injury caused a return
of the same disease or caused an illness to settle in the region of the weakness would not preclude a recovery.3 0 Thanks to this amelioration of the
normal Massachusetts-majority rule, the courts of that commonwealth are
not in the embarrassing position of having to turn down what are prima
facie valid claims by needy beneficiaries.
A second and similar modification of the majority view is made in New
York. Normally that state adheres to the majority view and all of its consequences. 31' Mr. Justice Cardozo, however, made an inroad into the scope
of the rule by insisting on a narrow definition of the word "disease". In the

case of Silverstein v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.," he decided that an

ulcer was not a disease and thus not one of the causes of death. In reaching
that conclusion, he said in part:
"A distinction, then, is to be drawn between a morbid or abnormal
condition of such quality or degree that in its natural and probable
development it may be expected to be a source of mischief, in which
event it may fairly be described as a disease or infirmity, and a condition abnormal or unsound when tested by a standard of perfection,
yet so remote in its potential mischief that common speech would call
it not disease or infirmity, but at most a predisposing tendency." 's

(Italics added.)
As has been the case with many Cardozo pronouncements, this view has
been adopted and followed by courts which otherwise might have followed
the majority view.34 The result of an application of this theory is that
30. Freeman v. Mercantile Mut. Accident Ass'n, 156 Mass. 351, 3o N. E. 1013

(1892) ; see Leland v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 233 Mass.
558, 564, 124 N. E. 517, 520 (1919). Accord: New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Shields,
155 Fed. 54 (C. C. A. 6th, 19o). See Barnett v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 24
N. E. (2d) 662 (Mass., 1939). In Sullivan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 96 Mont. 254,
29 P. (2d) 1046 (1934), after holding that there could be no recovery because a pre-

existing disease contributed to death, quoted extensively from the Massachusetts cases
and said by way of dictum: "Under the particular policy provision [usual insuring
clause and the reduntant clause] here considered, if there was no active disease but
merely a frail general condition, so that the powers of resistance are easily overcome,
or merely a tendency to disease which is started up and made operative, resulting in
death, then there may be recovery, even though the accident would not have caused
that effect upon a person in a normal state."
31. McQuade v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 166 Misc. 524, 2 N. Y. S. (2d)
647 (Munic. Ct. 1938).
32. 254 N. Y. 8I, 171 N. E. 924 (930).
33. Id. at 84, 171 N. E. at 9r5.
34. Railway Mail Ass'n v. Shrader, ig N. E. (2d) 887 (Ind. App. 1939); Police
& Fireman's Ins. Co. v. Blunk, 2o N. E. (2d) 66o (Md. App. 1939) ; Mair v. Equitable
Life Assur. Soc., 193 Minn. 565, 259 N. W. 6o (1935) ; Berkowitz v. N. Y. Life Ins.
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recovery can be had against the insurer either because there was no disease
at all, or because the pre-existing condition was not such a force as contrbuted to death so as to prevent a recovery under the "sole" clause.
The Massachusetts and New York rules are justifiable on at least one
very important ground. There are many instances in which an infirmity
of some degree either contributes to death or has reduced the resistance of
the insured to such a state that death is more likely to result from an accident, but in which the infirmity is simply an incident of advancing age. A
typical example of this is arteriosclerosis, or hardening of the arteries, which
is a common occurrence with elderly persons. Since it is a normal, or at
least not an abnormal condition, it can well be argued that this is one of the
risks in the purview of the parties when they entered into the contract of
insurance, and therefore should not be considered as a cause of sufficient
magnitude to prevent the accident from being the sole cause of death.3"
It cannot be disputed that there is respectable authority denying a recovery
when death is hastened by such a sclerotic condition, 6 but it is submitted
that the preferable rule would permit a recovery despite the hardened
arteries or whatever the condition-so long as it is not abnormal, considering the age of the insured, for him to be suffering from such a condition.
Any other reasoning would close the door of recovery to the beneficiaries
of nearly every policy held by an insured, beset by the bodily weaknesses
that accompany
advancing years, who was not killed instantly by the
37
accident.

Although there may be some doubt as to the exact status of the Pennsylvania law, it seems to conform to the modifications just discussed. Because the exact condition of the Pennsylvania law is not too clear, a brief
survey of the more important cases appears to be in order. The first definite
statement of Pennsylvania's position on this problem was made in Kelley v.
Pittsburgh Casualty Co.35 There, the insured carried an accident policy in
which the company agreed to pay benefits for losses which resulted "directly
and independently of all other causes" from the accident. 89 He slipped on
ice, and so twisted his body that adhesions from a prior operation were
Co., 256 App. Div. 324, io N. Y. S. (2d) io6 (939) ; Gyulai v. Prudential Life Ins.
Co., 135 Pa. Super. 82, 4 A. (2d) 824 (1939) ; Browning v. Eq. Life Assur. Soc., 72
P. (2d) iO6o, rehearing denied, 8o P. (2d) 349 (1939). These cases are by no means
an exhaustive enumeration, but they are a representative cross-section of the cases
which have been decided under the influence of the Cardozo rule.
35. In United States Casualty Co. v. Thrush, 21 Ohio App. 129, 135, 152 N. E. 796
(1926), the Ohio court expressed this thought in these words: "To hold that the insurance company, by the issue of its policy, intended to adopt the view that the policy
would not be valid where natural diseases, especially of old age, make serious results
more probable from accidents, would be an unfair and unreasonable interpretation ...
The company intended a reasonable scope of insurance, and this can be accomplished
by holding the company liable for accidents which, operating on the physical system,
according to the natural and usual conditions of age produce serious illness or death."
36. Especially interesting in this respect is the recent case of Budzinski v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 287 Mich. 495, 283 N. W. 662 (1939), rev'd on rehearing, 287
Mich. 495, 286 N. W. 842 (1939).
In this case, the Michigan court first allowed recovery in a four to three opinion, and on rehearing reversed its former decision, adopting the prior dissent as its opinion. In a strong dissent, Chandler, J., pointed out that
the court was overruling a long line of cases allowing a recovery. The exact position
of the Michigan court, however, is doubtful because there was evidence that the insured
was suffering from arteriosclerosis which was marked for a man of his age.
37. The court in Freeman v. Mercantile Mut. Acc. Ass'n, 156 Mass. 35r, 354, 30
N. E. 1013 (1892), which is the leading case for the Massachusetts view remarked:
"To adopt the view contended for by the defendant [insurance company] would be to
make the policies worthless to beneficiaries in many cases of death where an injury
resulting from an accident was the'efficient cause."
38. 256 Pa. i, IOO Atl. 494 (1917).
39. The policy did not contain the "redundant clause".
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loosened. A second operation, and a period of disability resulted from this,
for which he sought a recovery. In a per curialn opinion, the Supreme
Court adopted the reasoning of the county court's decision on a motion for
judgment n. o. v.-that if the jury found that the adhesions would have
given the insured no trouble in the absence of the accident, and that the
accidental injury aggravated the disease so that death came sooner than it
would have otherwise, then the accident would be the sole cause of death.
The court defined the "sole and exclusive cause" to be the proximate cause.
After establishing this broad proposition, allowing a recovery if the
accident were the proximate cause of the death, and the disease only the
remote cause, the Court retreated to a diametrically opposed position in a
series of three cases. In the first of these, Hesse v. Travelers' Insurance
Co., 40 the Court decided that death on the operating table because of the
patient's hypersusceptibility to the anmsthetic used was not one of the risks
covered by the policy since the administering of the anmsthetic was not
accidental, but intentional; and since the effective cause of death was the
patient's oversensitivity to the anmsthetic, which was a contributing cause
of death so that the death could not have resulted independently of it.41 In
a vigorous dissent concurred in by Justices Kephart and Sadler, Mr. Justice
Frazer pointed out that the unexpected result of the administration of the
anasthetic should be regarded as accidental, and that therefore the administering of the drug was the proximate cause of death, since without that
unexpected event, the insured would probably have lived on for many
years.42 The next retreating step came in Ewing v. Equitable Life Assurance Society.43 In that case, the insured sought recovery under his accident
policy for loss resulting from the recurrence of a nervous disorder which
was precipitated by an automobile accident. The Court denied recovery
because "the recurrence of the disabling nervous condition was almost
entirely due to plaintiff's existent condition and the . . . accident was at
most the precipitating cause". 44 The Court relied on the Hesse case on the
ground that in both cases the unusual condition of the insured was the cause
of the loss. 45 The cycle of retreat was completed in Arnstein v. Metropolitan'Life Ins. Co.4" The Supreme Court there was bound by the lower
court's finding of fact that the disease did not contribute to death, but said
by way of dictum:
"Had the death resulted from the combination of the injury and
diabetes, and not from the injury alone, then, even though the injury
were the proximate and the diabetes merely the remote cause, there
would be no liability under the policy."4-7
Pa. 125, 149 Atl. 96 (1930).
41. For a discussion of this, and related cases, on the question of accidental means
see Note (1930) 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 762. Cf. especially Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Dodge, xi F. (2d) 486 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926), cert. denied, 271 U. S. 677 (1926).
42. The dissenting opinion also relied on the absence of the "redundant clause",
but as has been indicated supra, this fact should be of little consequence.
43. 320 Pa. 577, 182 Atl. 369 (i936).
44. Id. at 58o, z82 Atl. at 370.
45. The court distinguished the Kelley case on the ground that there was no exception of the risks of disease in the policy litigated in that case, while the redundant
clause was present in this case. This distinction does not seem tenable, but the court
might have made a more substantial distinction on the ground that Ewing's affliction
prior to the accident was much more malignant than the physical condition of the insured in the Kelley case. Ibid.
46. 329 Pa. 158, 196 Atl. 491 (1938).
47. Id. at 161, 196 At. at 493.
40. 299
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This dictum, then, marks a complete reversal of the field so that the Kelley
case, although not directly overruled, could hardly be regarded as a statement of the Pennsylvania law.
But the doctrine of the Kelley case was not dead. It arose again during
the past year in Kelly v. PrudentialLife Ihsurance Co. 48 In that case, Mr.
Justice Maxey, speaking for a unanimous court, adopted the reasoning of
the original Kelley case, and quoted extensively from it. In so doing, how49
ever, he indicated that the Ewing and Arnstein cases were still good law.
The implication of this statement is that the court intends to restrict the
reincarnated Kelley doctrine to the facts of the recent case. In other words,
recovery would be allowed where the pre-existing condition was simply a
normal incident of advancing age, such as arteriosclerosis in a degree not
disproportionate to the age of the insured-as was the situation in the Kelly
case; but the recovery would be denied if the disease was abnormal or
malignant in its nature. If this is the path that the Pennsylvania courts
intend to follow in the future, it is practically synonymous with the position
of the Massachusetts courts and the New York courts under the Cardozo
rule in the Silverstein case.
Of all the judicial positions that have been taken on this question, it is
submitted that this is the nearest approach to a fulfillment of the intentions
of the parties at the time the contract of insurance was made. Since the
courts are interpreting a contract when they are faced with this problem,
the intention of the parties should be their guiding star. On the one hand,
the terms in the policy to the effect that the accident should be the sole,
exclusive cause, independently of all other causes must be accorded some
meaning-and they can best be applied to the situation in which a disease,
which is clearly recognizable as such, co-operates to cause the death. A
striking example of this is found in the recent case of Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Loeb, 50 decided by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Prior to the
accident, the insured had been receiving benefits for total disability from
chronic nephritis, arteriosclerosis, arthritis and diabetes. As a result of the
accident, an infection arose, which, because of the various diseases with
which the insured was afflicted caused death. The court denied recovery,
and rightly so despite the fact that the applicable Georgia law might possibly
be interpreted as sanctioning a recovery.9" That the injury could be the
"sole and exclusive cause" of death 52 when the insured is debilitated
by
such a galaxy of ailments seems inconceivable. It is equally inconceivable
that the parties, in drawing up the contract of insurance, contemplated payment of accident or double indemnity benefits under these circumstances.
On the other hand, a careful study of the intent of the parties would
invariably disclose that the mutual intent was not to preclude a recovery
because the effect of the accident upon some bodily weakness, not enough
in and of itself to be regarded as a disease, was to cause death more
quickly. 13 The insurer should not escape liability because one of the ail48. 334 Pa. 143, 6 A. (2d) 55 (1939).
49. Id. at 152, 6 A. (2d) at 59.
50. 107 F. (2d) 7 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939).
51. Hall v. General Acc. Assur. Co., 16 Ga. App. 66, 85 S. E. 6oo (1915) ; Thornton v. Travelers' Life Ins. Co., 116 Ga. 121, 42 S. E. 287 (1902).
52. This proposition would seem to be true regardless of the redundant disease
clause. The court in the Loeb case seized upon the presence of the proviso as a basis
for distinguishing it from the prior Georgia cases which the court would be bound to
follow under the rule of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins.
53. A typical judicial expression of this thought can be found in Druhl v. Equitable
Life Assur. Co., 56 N. D. 517, 524, 218 N. W. 220, 223 (1928) : "It does not seem reasonable to believe that, when the parties spoke of 'physical infirmity' [in a policy con-
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ments which conventionally accompany advancing age happens to make an
elderly insured more susceptible to the evil consequences of an accidental
injury, and this is especially so when the insurer accepts premiums from an
insured who is advanced in years. 54 If the insurer could thus avoid liability
on the double indemnity or accident policy whenever senility and its resultant physical decadence appears, almost every policy would be valueless to
the beneficiaries unless the force of the accident killed the insured instantly.
The same considerations apply when the insured, whether old or young, has
a pre-existing tendency to disease, which cannot be classified as a disease
or infirmity, but which is set in motion by an accident, and which aggravates
the effects of the accident. This was expressed most recently in a dictum
in Barnett v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co.55 The Massachusetts court after deciding that death was caused entirely by the accident,
went on to indicate that if the insured merely had pneumonia germs in his
body at the time of the accident, and his resistance was so lowered by the
accident that the germs became active and developed into pneumonia which
caused death, the jury would be warranted in finding that the loss was within
the policy's coverage. 58 This reasoning is not only appealing, but convincing.
There is one difficulty which persists under the New York-Massachusetts view. That is the problem of determining when the insured is suffering
from a disease which would preclude recovery when it concurs with the
accident in causing death, as distinguished from a mere weakness which
would not bar a recovery even though it joined with the force of the accident in causing death. The Cardozo test that the "disease or infirmity must
be so considerable or significant that it would be characterized as a disease
or infirmity in the common speech of men" 51 is helpful, but involves a
fundamental difficulty. It is a legal test of the existence of a scientific fact
which is plainly in the realm of medicine. Since the legal test as to the
existence of this scientific fact is prone to err, the test is not sufficiently
reliable. A more logical approach, it is submitted, would be to make the
question of the degree of the affliction one for the jury to decide upon the
basis of expert medical testimony presented to them. Such a procedure,
when used in conjunction with the modifications of the majority rule as laid
down in New York and Massachusetts, would provide a fair and equitable
answer to this most perplexing problem since it would effectuate the intent
of the parties to the insurance contract and at the same time would allow a
recovery by the beneficiaries without a disproportionate burden on the
insurer in these borderline cases.
A. H., Jr.
taining the disease proviso] they had in mind any slight derangement, malformation or
susceptibility to disease, of which the insured was ignorant, which even the medical
examiner of the company did not discover, and which probably no other physician
would have discovered. . . . It seems reasonable to believe that by the term 'physical infirmity' the parties had in mind settled disease, ailments, or derangements of such
nature and character as had a direct tendency to weaken and undermine the constitution of the insured, reduce his powers of resistance, and thereby enhance the risk of
death in case of injury."
54. Clarke v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 18o Cal. 76, 179 Pac. 195 (1919) ; Moon
v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 96 Neb. 65, 146 N. W. 1037
(1914).
55. 24 N. E. (2d) 662 (Mass., 1939).
56. Id. at 664.
57- Silverstein v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 254 N. Y. 81, 84, 171 N. E. 914
(r930).
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Trade Mark Protection Following "Ineffective" Assignment
It has been traditionally supposed that the primary, and in fact the
only, function of a trade mark 1 is to indicate to the public the origin, manufacture or ownership of articles to which it is applied.2 In connection with
this particular function, the old dogma that trade marks cannot be transferred in gross, i. e. apart from the business in which they are used, has
been perfectly properly applied. Yet the modern expansion of this narrow
conception of the purpose of a trade mark is evidenced, in one way, by the
gradual development of the guaranty function, wherein a trade mark may
be regarded as a guaranty to the public of the quality of the goods to which
it applies. Under this theory, it would seem that any change in origin or
ownership would not affect the value of the trade mark, and that the dogma
against assignability in gross, if applicable at all, would take on a different
meaning. Such a conclusion logically follows when it is remembered that,
basically, the dogma represents an effort to protect the public from being
defrauded into buying one thing while intending to buy another. Thus
where the trade mark represents origin of the goods the dogma should
properly apply to prevent its assignment without also assigning the source
of the goods. But where the trade mark indicates only goods of a certain
quality, it seems that the sole requirement is that it continue to be applied
to goods of the same kind and quality. Whether this is denying the applicability of the dogma or merely tempering its meaning is only a matter of
words.
Unfortunately, however, the meaning of the dogma did not undergo
changes coextensively with the development of the varying purposes of the
trade mark, and often it was applied with its original force unmitigated
regardless of the function of the particular mark involved, producing harsh
results in many cases. So, although a trade mark apparently had a real
value for which the would-be assignee was willing to pay, and although the
mark could be used by such assignee without deceiving the public, he was
denied all protection in case of infringement, to the detriment of his property rights and to the further fraud of the public. Often the assignor would
have no better right to protect the mark, the theory being that he had
abandoned all his rights by the attempted assignment, the mark thereafter
being regarded as publici jur. Such a state of affairs, if persisted in, opens
a wide field within which the so-called business pirate can, with impunity,
seize the trade insignia of others and capitalize on
the reputation built up
4
by them through dint of much labor and expense.
Sometimes a trade mark might not even be an index of quality, arising
solely through extensive advertising, forming in customers the habit of asking for the particular article by name, not because it is better than any
other, but merely because they happen to know the name. An exclusive
right to the use of such a name or mark is in protection of expenses laid
out in advertising only, and whether or not such a right should be recog1. As used throughout this note, "trade mark" is intended to include "trade name"
as well. Such differences as there are between the two do not affect the present discussion. For distinguishing features see Nims, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS (3d ed. 1929) 518, 523.
2. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403, 412 (I916) ; Kidd v.
Johnson, ioo U. S. 617, 62o (1879) ; NIMs, op. cit. supra note I, 502 et seq.; 5 PomERoY, EQUITY JxrmsPRuDENCE (4th ed. 1919) § 1998.
3. See Everett 0. Fisk & Co. v. Fisk Teachers' Agency, 3 F. (2d) 7, 8 (C. C. A.
8th, 1924) ; United Razor Blade Corp. v. Akron Drug Co., 52 Ohio App. 379, 392, 3
N. E. (2d) 902, 9o7 (1935); Nims, op. cit. supra note 1, at 66 et seq.
4. See Isaacs, Traffic i Trade-Symbols (1931) 44 HIv. L. REv. 1210.
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nized for the good of the public is a further policy consideration. But the
cases in general seem to fall under one of two main headings, those involving
personal service concerns and those involving mercantile establishments.
Yet, even though a personal service concern normally depends exclusively
upon the skill and professional qualities of its leaders, there seems to be no
real reason for treating the two groups as basically different. In case of
assignment of the insignia of a personal service organization, deception of
the public is readily avoided by indicating the survivorship or change of
personnel. 5
BASIS OF EQUITY JURISDICTION
The leading case of Falk v. American West Indies Trading Co.8 serves
as an appropriate illustration on which to base further discussion. Therein,
L, cigar manufacturer, on going out of business purported to assign to P,
plaintiff, the right to use the trade mark "El Falcon" in his own business
established at a different place. P's suit for an injunction against infringement by D, who had adopted and used the name "El Falco" on his cigars,
was denied, apparently on the ground that the trade mark as used by L
distinguished a cigar manufactured by himself, and use by P could amount
only to selling his own goods as those of another in fraud of the public. The
precise basis of the decision was befogged by language in the opinion to the
effect that a trade mark is an inseparable part of the business and good will
with which it has been associated, and that an attempted transfer of the
"naked trade mark" confers no rights upon the assignee.7 Thus, whether
lack of clean hands on P's part or the fact that the attempted transfer was
thought to be a mere nullity actually controlled the result is impossible to
determine. At least the court gave no indication that any different result
would be forthcoming were P to make it clear in his use of the mark that
the cigars were no longer being made by L. 5 While perhaps the soundness
of the case upon its exact facts cannot be disputed, its implications, arising
from the vagueness of the opinion, are disturbing. Blind adherence to the
dogma that a trade mark cannot be transferred in gross, together with failure to give due regard to the nature of trade marks and their varying purposes, as previously suggested, materially increases the likelihood of a harsh
result in the individual case. So, in Eiseman v. Schiffer,' G attempted to
assign to P for a definite period all right to the registered trade mark
"radium", which had been applied by G to certain varieties of silk dress
goods. The written assignment purported to transfer the trade mark
together with the good will of the business in which it had been used,
although, following the alleged transfer, G continued to produce the same
article, applying a different trade mark thereto. On suit to enjoin infringement by D, P was denied relief because the transfer in reality did not
include "that special business with the trade mark of which it was the
parent",' 0 and G was denied relief on the ground that, since he had discontinued the use of the word "radium" following the attempted transfer, a
case of abandonment had been made out.'- The court made no effort to
5. See DERENBERG, TRADE-MARK PROTECTION AND UNFAIR TRADING (1936) 572;
but cf. Messer v. The Fadettes, 168 Mass. 140, 46 N. E. 407 (I897).
6. 18o N. Y. 445, 73 N. E. 239 (1905).
7. Id. at 449, 73 N. E. at 240.
8. Such a result could be reached only on the ground that the trade mark had some
value other than that of signifying source, which P could use legitimately without deceiving the public.
9. 157 Fed. 473 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 19o7).
IO.Id. at 476.
ii. The decision was apparently based upon an interpretation of the registration
statute providing that every registered trade mark shall be assignable in connection
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determine the significance of the trade mark involved, whether it denoted
the source of the goods so marked or merely goods of a certain quality. If
the latter interpretation
is the correct one the result of the case seems
12
questionable.
The Eiseman case evidences a strictly legalistic approach, assuming
that a trade mark, apart from the business or good will to which it has
been attached, has no existence and that its attempted assignment separately confers nothing of value upon the assignee. Proper definition of the
business or good will to which the mark has been attached is essential to
successful application of such a rule. The indication is that the assignor
here retains all his rights under the trade mark unless a case of abandonment is made out.
The other approach, at least suggested in the Falk case, is essentially
a practical one and is more willing to accept the conception of value entertained by the parties to the assignment. It seems to assume that the
assignee has acquired a valuable right, yet refuses to enforce it at his suit
so long as his use of the mark is likely to deceive the public. But while
professing to be protecting the public from deception, the court, in applying
this rule, in fact makes possible two frauds, one by the assignee and one by
the alleged infringer, the suggestion being that the assignor retains no
rights upon which he can base a suit against the infringer.
Fundamentally, the two approaches differ as to the theory upon which
equity assumes jurisdiction in trade mark infringement cases. If the remedy
depends upon a property right acquired by the assignee, 13 the first approach
is more tenable, but if the remedy depends rather upon the broad principle
that equity will not permit fraud to be practiced upon the public,' 4 the
latter would seem to be sounder in its basis. Practically the two viewpoints
are not always distinguishable in the cases, and the chief concern here is
to see if they are reconcilable, and to determine, if possible, the legalized
scope of the business pirate's activities, and to what extent the trade mark
rights of individuals are in reality protected.
TRADE MARK CHARACTERISTICS AND THE DOCTRINE OF ASSIGNMENT

It is generally recognized that the common law of trade marks is but
a part of the broader law of unfair competition which condemns the passing
off of one person's goods as those of another in fraud of the public and at
the expense of the owner of the trade mark.' 5 Essentially a trade mark has
no intrinsic value, being merely symbolic of the good will of the business
,vith the good will of the business in which the mark is used. Yet, inasmuch as it is
generally recognized that trade mark statutes have made no change in the common lanx
of trade marks, it would seem that the applicable principles remain unchanged. Nrms
op. cit. supra note I, at 592 et seq.
12. The importance of determining what the trade mark means in each individual
case is clearly developed in Grismore, The Assignment of Trade Marks and Trade
Names (1932) 30 MicEa. L. REv. 489. See also Isaacs, loc. cit. mtPra note 4.
13. Trade Mark Cases, ioo U. S. 82 (1879). "Common-law trade-marks, and the
right to their exclusive use, are of course to be classed among property rights . . .;
but only in the sense that a man's right to the continued enjoyment of his trade reputation and the good will that flows from it, free from unwarranted interference by others,
is a property right, for the protection of which a trade-mark is an instrumentality."
Mr. Justice Pitney, in Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403, 413 (1i16).
See Nims, op. cit. supra note i, at 25 et seq., 520 et seq. "The rule that a court of
equity concerns itself only in the protection of property rights treats any civil right of
a pecuniary nature as a property right." Mr. Justice Pitney in International News
Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, 236 (1918).
14. Compare 4 PoMERoY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 3236, with 5 PomEaoY, op. cit
spra note 2, at 4528. See also 2 HIGHr, INjuNcTIoN s (4th ed. 1905) Io68 et seq.; 3
RESTATEMENT, TORTS (938)
§ 715, comment b.
15. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 24o U. S. 403, 413 (1916).
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in which it is used.' Perhaps the most satisfactory definition of good will
from the standpoint of present day conceptions is that viewing it as the
expectation of custom acquired through business endeavor, as a state of
mind existing in persons which causes them to continue patronizing a certain place, person or article.' 7 When a trade mark is looked upon merely
as an outward manifestation of this good will, as the instrumentality
through which the good will is identified or by which it is developed, it
becomes less difficult to understand the true limitations of the dogma that
trade marks cannot be assigned apart from the business or good will with
which they have become associated. For example, where the particular
trade mark denotes source or origin of the goods to which it applies, it
cannot be assigned to another for use on goods emanating from a different
source. Incidentally such would be productive of a fraud upon the public,
but primarily it would be a physical impossibility since the good will in this
case is only the state of mind of the consumer which causes him to patronize
a certain place, the trade mark serving no other purpose than to identify
this particular good will. In such case the consumer, being influenced only
by the source of the goods, is in no sense of the word a prospective customer
of the assignee. On the other hand where the trade mark involved denotes
nothing more than goods of a certain quality, the good will which it symbolizes is the probability that the consumer will continue to patronize the particular article regardless of its source or its manuafcturer, and there seems
to be no good reason why an assignment thereof should not be given effect,
though unaccompanied by transfer of tangible business equipment of any
sort.
While the above analysis is developed on the logical basis of the
existence of a property right in a trade mark which is capable of transfer,
it is inextricably interwoven with the practical aspect of protection of the
public from deception, since it adopts as the test of the existence of a transferable property right the significance of the mark in the mind of the consumer. The conclusion is irresistible that the likelihood of deception is the
only limitation upon the assignability of trade marks.' In interpreting the
decided cases then, it becomes of primary importance to determine the purpose which the particular trade mark is intended to serve and its significance
to the members of the buying public.
PROTECTION AT THE SUIT OF THaE ASSIGNEE

In the case of Independent Baking Powder Co. v. Boorman, 9 P sought
to enjoin D's infringing use of the trade mark "Solar", as applied to baking powder. The evidence showed that one S had originally acquired the
mark, using it together with four or five other marks upon an alum baking
powder. S assigned to P the trade mark "Solar" together with the right
to manufacture and sell baking powder with that name affixed, but continued to manufacture the same identical powder, applying thereto all trade
marks previously used except "Solar". P's bill was dismissed on the ground
that the assignment of the trade mark did not include the good will and
business with which it had become associated, and thus conferred upon P no
rights in the use thereof.20 The decision was based upon the assumption
16. See NIhis, op. cit. supra note I, at 51, 506.
17. See Grismore, supra note 12, at 492.
18. See Grismore, supra note 12, at 495, 496; D.RENBERG, op. cit. supra note 5, at
571 et seq.
19. 175 Fed. 448 (C. C. D. N. J. igio).
20. The fact that P was guilty of unclean hands in using the mark upon a phosphate powder rather than an alum powder with which it was associated was treated as
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that a person may legitimately own and use in his business several different
trade marks upon the same article, but, although the evidence showed that
the trade mark involved represented grade rather than origin and ownership, the court refused to recognize that the good will of the business could
be split up so as to effectuate the assignment where the assignor continued
the same identical business, though under unassigned trade marks. It
would seem that this case, involving much the same principle as that in
Eiseman v. Schiffer, is subject to the same criticism, 2' and is, perhaps, out
of line with the more modern conception of good will as evidenced in American Crayon Co. v. Prang Co. 22 Therein, M, who was engaged in the school
and art supply business selling many separate articles under the trade mark
"Prang", assigned to P all rights in the mark as applied to certain enumerated articles, retaining the right to use the mark on other articles and also
the right to deal in the enumerated articles without the mark. In P's suit
to restrain D's infringement, D argued that the contract between M and P
was the assignment of a trade mark in gross and therefore invalid. In
denying this contention, the court said it was obvious that P acquired that
and good will of M represented by the articles spedportion of the business
23
fied in the contract.
A closely related, and perhaps more usual, question arises where the
trade mark involved has two or more different connotations as to one of
which it is not properly assignable. The problem is well crystallized in the
case of Mulhens & Kropff v. er. Muelhens, Inc. 24 Muelhens had established an agency in the United States for the sale of products manufactured
by him in Germany, some, including cologne, incorporating a secret formula,
some not, and granted to this agency the right to use the trade mark "4711"
in connection therewith. During the war the Alien Property Custodian
confiscated the business of the agency, except the secret formula, and sold
it to P who thereafter sold its products under the "4711" label, although
without the use of the secret formula which it did not know. After the
war, D, another sales agency established by Muelhens in the United States
resumed distribution of his products under the mark "4711". P sued to
enjoin D's use of the mark and it was held that an injunction was proper
only with respect to articles which did not originally incorporate the secret
formula. The court recognized that, as applied to cologne, the trade mark
denoted both origin in the house of Muelhens, and manufacture under a
secret recipe. Further conceding that P, as successor to Muelhens' business
in this country, was entitled to use the mark in its first meaning, the court
apparently felt that the secret remedy connotation of the mark predominated
a distinct point in the case. Id. at 454. This would seem to justify the final result of
the case regardless of the question of validity of the assignment.
21. See p. 864 supra. It is said that good will cannot be sold to one while the
original owner continues the business as before. Bulte v. Igleheart Bros., 137 Fed. 492,
498 (C. C. A. 7th, 1905). But when the owner gives up his valuable right to the use
of a certain trade mark he is not continuing business as before. Whether or not he
continues to produce the same goods without the trade mark should make no difference.
It is fundamental that a trade mark confers no monopoly in the manufacture of certain

goods.

22. 28 F. (2d) 515 (D. Del. 1928), rev'd on another ground, 38 F. (2d) 448 (C. C.
A. 3d, 1930). See Note (1930) 24 ILL. L. REv. 591.
23. Cf. Southeastern Brewing Co. v. Blackwell, 8o F. (2d) 6o7 (C. C. A. 4 th,
1935), (3936) 4 DUKE B. A. J. 117; but cf. Everett 0. Fisk & Co. v. Fisk Teachers'
Agency, 3 F. (2d) 7 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924) ; Molka Wines Co., Inc. v. Rosenthal, i6o
N. Y. Misc. 8o5, 29o N. Y. Supp. 717 (1936).
17 ST. Louis L. REV. 9r, rez/g,
24. 43 F. (2d) 937 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930), (931)
38 F. (2d) 287 (S. D. N. Y. 1929), (1930) 30 CoL. L. REV. 133. See Note (393o) 43

HAzv. L. REv. 636, discussing the decision of the district court.
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to such an extent that use by P, without the secret formula, could not be
otherwise than deceptive to the public. In fact its feeling ran so strongly
on this point that it refused to sustain the decree of the lower court granting an injunction only upon condition that P dearly indicate in its use of
the mark that the secret formula was not being employed.
The only possible way to resolve the seeming inconsistency in the position thus taken is to conclude that the court in reality attached no value to
the use of the mark in its first meaning, deeming prospective customers to
be interested only in the genuine article regardless of its origin. 25 Indeed
the dissent26 admitted that P's right to represent its products as emanating
from the old source, the American branch of Muelhens' business, became
very thin in this case, observing that the customers presumably cared nothing about the place where the cologne was made up, and much about the
essence. But rather than speculate upon how much of the value of the
trade mark was properly allocable to use in its first meaning, the dissent
felt that P had acquired the right to use the mark in its first sense which
right should be protected for what it was worth. However, since P in
its use of the mark had falsely led its customers to suppose they were
getting cologne made under the recipe, a decree conditional upon the discontinuance of this deceit was advocated. Fundamentally it would seem
that the disagreement between the majority and minority in the Mulheis
case centered around the question of whether the trade mark involved
denoted anything more than articles manufactured under a secret formula.
To the extent that it had any other connotation P had dearly acquired the
right to its use and the granting of a decree in its favor conditional upon
his cleaning his hands represents a inore desirable method of handling the
case than dismissing the bill as res judicata,forestalling any future attempt
by P to enforce his rights after cessation of the fraud.
However, the modern trend of the law, as evidenced by the Prang
case, exhibits a decided effort to determine the true nature of the trade
mark as used in a particular case, to ascribe to it a value more in conformance with the business man's conception, and to grant protection of the
mark in the hands of the assignee where non-deceptive use by him is
assured. A further problem, as indicated in the Prang case and in the dissenting opinion of the Mulhens case, arises where the assignee although
holding a properly transferable right in the trade mark, uses it in such a
manner as is likely to deceive the public. Seeking equitable relief for
infringement, the assignee immediately runs up against the "clean hands"
doctrine based upon the principle that equity will not act to give equitable
relief to one who has been guilty of fraud in connection with the same
matter.2 7 It has been truly said that "an exclusive privilege for deceiving
the public is assuredly not one that a court of equity can be required to aid
or sanction." 28 This particular phase of the doctrine is that in which
plaintiff's hands are unclean because of his conduct toward the public as
his prospective customers, 29 and is based upon the assumption that plaintiff
has such an interest in the trade mark as would be otherwise entitled to
protection. However the extent to which the assignee is barred from relief
is dependent upon whether his misrepresentation is fraudulent or innocent.
In the normal case, where no misrepresentation occurs, the assignee may
be entitled to damages and an accounting of profits as well as to an injunc25.

43 F.

(2d)

at 939.

26. Id. at 94o.
27. WAL.sH, EQUTrrY (1930) 283, n. 9, and cases cited therein.
28. 6 PomrERoy, op. cit. supra note 2, at 999.
29. 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938)
§ 749, comment g.
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tion.80 Where misrepresentation appears, although innocent, an injunction
may be granted on condition that the misrepresentation be discontinued,
and it is only in cases involving misrepresentation which is openly and
8
grossly fraudulent that all relief is denied under the clean hands doctrine. ,
Clearly the doctrine, as here applied, has for its purpose the protection of
the public from the misleading conduct of plaintiff, attemption to achieve
this end by constructing a negative deterrent upon such conduct. With
this in mind, the courts should proceed slowly in denying even conditional
relief, since, by so doing, the fraudulent conduct of the defendant is perpetuated. Thus in the Prang case it appeared that P was engaging in an extensive advertising campaign in an endeavor to expand its business in disregard of the "Prang" rights reserved by M, successfully leading the public
to believe that its "Prang" products were not limited to the articles specified
in the assignment from M. The lower court, invoking the clean hands doctrine, refused to grant any form of relief, dismissing the bill apparently as
res judicata. On appeal this decree was reversed and an injunction was
allowed.82 In as much as D in this, M's successor in its business and in
the "Prang" rights reserved under the assignment from M to P, had filed
a counterclaim for injunctive relief against P, the court was enabled to
enjoin P's misconduct directly, removing the necessity of conditioning the
injunction granted in P's behalf. In answer to the position taken by the
lower court, the appellate court observed that the misconduct of the parties
was an almost inevitable result of the attempt to split up a trade mark such
as that here involved, and that the consequent violation of rights was more
properly attributed to business zeal and insistence upon supposed rights
than to rank dishonesty. 8 Where plaintiff has discontinued misrepresentations before bringing his action and there appears to be no further likelihood
of deception, such past misrepresentations will not bar relief.8 4 Even where
misrepresentations have not been previously discontinued and plaintiff's
suit is dismissed without any relief whatever, the indication is that such
dismissal is not regarded as predujdicial to plaintiff's commencing a new
action upon cleaning its hands.8
It appears from the above consideration of the assignee's rights to protection, that the only sizeable loophole for the business pirate is in the cases
where the attempted assignment is actually without effect so far as conferring any thing of value upon the assignees is concerned. It remains to
be seen how effectively this hole can be plugged by the would-be assignor.
PROTECTION AT THE SUIT OF THE ASSIGNOR
It seems clear from the Eisenan case that, following an attempted
assignment which is regarded as a nullity, the assignor retains all his
30. Normally where the infringement was unintentional an accounting will not be
ordered. Nms, op. cit. supra note i, at io78.
31. 3 RESTATEmENT, ToRTs (1938) § 749, comment h.
32. 38 F. (2d) 448 (C. C. A. 3d, 193o).
33. Id. at 450.
34. 3 RESTATEMENT, ToRTS (1938) § 749, comment h.
35. In the Mulhiens case, P was denied a preliminary injunction because he was
falsely advertising that his product was being made in accordance with the original
recipe. 38 F. (2d) 287, 290 (S. D. N. Y. 1929). Yet, after ceasing such false advertisement, he was granted relief in the district court. 38 F. (2d) 287 (S. D. N. Y.
1929). The reversal in the appellate court was not based upon the original dismissal
of the bill as res jidicata. 43 F. (2d) 937 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930). See HANDLER, CASES
AND MATmRIALS ON TRADE REGuLATION (1937) 706, and cases cited therein; Handler,
False and Misleading Advertising (1929) 39 YALE L. J. 22, 49 et seq.
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former interest in the trade mark unless a case of abandonment is made
out. Such a position gives further support to the view that invalidity of
the assignment is based primarily upon the property concept that the
assignee receives nothing of value, rather than upon the reasoning that the
assignee's use of the mark will perpetrate a fraud upon the public, since as
a consequence of the latter view the assignor might well be denied equitable
relief as a participant in a fraudulent scheme. As regards the doctrine of
abandonment, there has been much dispute over its actual foundation.
Courts have long paid lip service to the rule that abandonment is purely a
question of intent, acts which otherwise might establish abandonment being
explainable by showing that there was never any intent to relinquish the
right claimed.37 A further requisite is that there must be an external act,
such as disuser or acquiescence in use by others, by which the intention to
abandon is evidenced or carried into effect.88 Moreover, the intent required
must apparently be that the public at large may appropriate the mark, not
merely that one or a limited number of persons may do so. Yet the courts,
realizing that this theory of abandonment is opposed to the so-called functional theory of trade marks justifying their use solely because of associative significance in the public mind, have become adept at finding abandonment without the requisite intent where associative significance has decayed,
as well as failing to support the defense of abandonment where the associative significance lingers on, although confronted with evidence of the requisite intent. 9 Logically, a case of abandonment could never be strictly made
out on the basis of an unsuccessful attempt to assign, since the argument
that an intent to give up all interest in the mark to public use is evidenced
by such an act is hardly tenable.40 Rather than this, the intent evidenced
by the assignor is to capitalize upon a reputation built up through industry
and initiative, to transfer something of value in return for a consideration,
with the knowledge that a failure to transfer anything of value would subject him to liability at the instance of the assignee. So the rationale behind
the ruling in the Eiseman case must have been that the mark had lost its
associative significance to the public and hence its value to the assignor. 41
Whether or not an abandonment is made out under such a theory depends,
of course, upon the nature of the trade mark, the length of time before
knowledge of the invalidity of the assignment is brought home to the
assignor, as well as upon the effect of the assignee's unwarranted user upon
the associative significance of the mark. It is true that hardship may result
in individual cases, but the point to be noted is that proper application of
the doctrine will not only effectively curtail the activities of the business
pirate, but will also protect the interest of the assignor in the mark. Concededly where an abandonment is made out the assignor may have lost his
property, either in the form of his right to exclusive user of the mark or in
the form of the consideration received for the assignment, without any intention to do so. But the fact remains that so long as the mark retains its
36. See Note (1930) 30 COL. L. Rzv. 695.
37. See Saxlehner v. Eisner & Mendelson Co., 179 U. S. 19, 31 (igoo); NIms, op.
cit. supra note I, at Ili.
38. Nims, op. cit. supranote I, at IOO.
39. See Note (1930) 30 COL. L. Ray. 695, 696, 697, and cases cited therein.
4o. But cf. La Fayette Brewery, Inc. v. Rock Isd. Brewing Co., 87 F. (2d) 489
(C. C. P. A. 1937) ; Sauers Milling Co. v. Kehlor Flour Mills Co., 39 App. D. C. 535
(1913).
41. Accord, Interstate Distilleries v. Sherwood Dist. & Distrib. Co., 173 Md. 173,
195 Atl. 387 (937), (938) 22 MINN. L. R.v. 750. See Mack and Milans, Legal
Status of Liquor Trade-Marks and Trade Names Since Repeal (1934) 2 GEo. WAsH.
L. Ray. 415.
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associative significance which is synonymous with its value to the assignor,
he may properly seek equitable relief from interference by others.
In connection with the problem of handling trade marks with more than
one purpose, for one of which it may be assignable, and for another of which
it may not be assignable, the previous development might seem to indicate,
as its logical consequence, that the assignor retains the right to use the
mark for the purpose as to which it is non-assignable. Thus, in infringement cases it would be necessary to determine the nature of the particular
infringement-whether a violation of the rights of the assignee or of the
assignor. In reality, however, such a refinement is not only impractical but
against usual business practice. Actually, much of the value of a trade
mark rests in its uniqueness, 42 so that its mere use by others, even on dissimilar products, 4 3 necessarily detracts from its selling power. Thus, where

it is apparent that the parties bargained with the idea that the uniqueness
of the mark should not be imposed upon by the assignor, he should not be
heard to justify such imposition either in suit for breach of assignment contract or in infringement proceedings, on the ground that his use of the
mark was one for which it was not assignable. Of course, where, as in the
Prang case, the parties deliberately split up the trade mark rights, the
refinement above pointed out cannot be avoided, yet the Prang case aptly
illustrates the confusion likely to result from such an attempt to apportion
the rights to use the mark.
CONCLUSION

Under modern law the old dogma that a trade mark cannot be assigned
in gross has lost much of its significance. Such meaning as it retains is
certainly not revealed by its mere statement, and can only be apprehended
by a study of the more recent cases paying verbal obeisance to it. As previously indicated, the tendency now is to recognize the assignment of a
mark as one not in gross even though nothing passes with the right to use
the mark other than the business getting capacity inherent in the mark itself,
44
i. e. the intangible good will with which the mark has become associated.
Greater encouragement of this trend in the law will serve to bring into
alignment the conceptions entertained by the law and the business man as
to the nature of one of the most prevalent custom-getting devices.
Where the assignee fraudulently uses his mark so as to mislead the
consuming public, equity's refusal to protect his property right is richly
merited. Yet denial of relief is being tempered more and more often in
order to avoid the consequences of defendant's fraud. The use of conditional decrees to this end, though sometimes objectionable as enabling plaintiff to speculate as to the respective values of proceeding fraudulently in
competition with fraud, or proceeding without fraud and without the competition,45 is often desirable. To enjoin both parties to the infringement suit
from the commission of further fraud would seem to be an intelligent
method of handling the problem, but this procedure is not at present in
general use. 46 Yet in the last analysis there is in existence adequate
42. See Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trade Mark Protection (1927) 40 HAv.
L. REv. 813, in which it is argued that the preservation of the uniqueness of a trade
mark should constitute the only rational basis for its protection.
43. See (1937)

16 TEx. L. REv. 127.

44. See p. 866 supra. See Note (93o) 24 ILL. L. REV. 591, 595.
45. See Thompson v. Bums, 15 Idaho 572, 603, 99 Pac. 111, 121 (19o8).
46. Yet decrees conditional in form have been held equally binding upon both parties, apparently on the theory that the plaintiff, in coming into equity, voluntarily submits to a decree against himself as a condition of relief. Boston v. Shackelford, 162
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machinery with which to protect the respective interests of the assignor and
assignee in their trade marks as well as the public interest, its effectiveness
depending upon the courts' willingness to make full use of it.
S.W.F.
Va. 733, 175 S. E. 625 (1934), (1935) 35 Co.. L. REv. 115. This case involved a suit
by vendee for specific performance of a contract for the sale of land, the decree being
conditioned upon payment by vendee, such condition being imposed for the protection
of the defendant. Where the condition is imposed for the protection of the public, as in
a trade mark infringement case, it seems doubtful whether defendant would have any
standing to enforce it, even if inclined to do so, which is hard to imagine.

